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Multivariate cryptography is one of the most promising candidates for post-quantum cryptography. Applying machine learning
techniques in this paper, we experimentally investigate the side-channel security of the multivariate cryptosystems, which se-
riously threatens the hardware implementations of cryptographic systems. Generally, registers are required to store values of
monomials and polynomials during the encryption of multivariate cryptosystems. Based on maximum-likelihood and fuzzy
matching techniques, we propose a template-based least-square technique to efficiently exploit the side-channel leakage of
registers. Using QUAD for a case study, which is a typical multivariate cryptosystemwith provable security, we perform our attack
against both serial and parallel QUAD implementations on field programmable gate array (FPGA). Experimental results show that
our attacks on both serial and parallel implementations require only about 30 and 150 power traces, respectively, to successfully
reveal the secret key with a success rate close to 100%. Finally, efficient and low-cost strategies are proposed to resist side-
channel attacks.
1. Introduction
With the upcoming quantum computers, traditional cryp-
tosystems face huge challenges. Public-key cryptosystems
such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC), whose security relies on the difficulty
of certain number theoretic problems, are under great threat
of quantum attack. In as early as 1994, Peter Shor proposed
an algorithm on a quantum computer that efficiently solved
such number theoretic problems in polynomial time. Af-
terward,Monz et al. [1] presented the realization of a scalable
Shor algorithm in 2016, which means that once large-scale
quantum computers appear, public-key cryptosystems will
become insecure. Meanwhile, for symmetric-key primitives,
larger keys are required to resist the quantum attack to some
extent.
Since Shor’s discovery, the theory of post-quantum
cryptography has developed significantly. Many crypto-
graphic schemes proposed in the literature, such as code-
based cryptography [2] and lattice-based cryptography [3],
show great potentiality to resist quantum attacks, while
multivariate cryptography is one of the most promising
candidates [4]. Afterward, numerous cryptosystems based
on multivariate quadratic polynomials have been proposed,
such as unbalanced oil-and-vinegar (UOV) and its variant
[5], Rainbow [5, 6], ZHFE [7], and CHNN-MVC [8].
At Eurocrypt 2006, Berbain et al. [9] presented the first
multivariate stream cipher scheme denoted as QUAD, which
is referred to as a practical and provable secure stream ci-
pher, as well as a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG).
In 2009, Berbain et al. [10] revisited the stream cipher of
QUAD and proposed the provable security arguments
supporting its conjectured strength for suitable parameter
values. +e provable security of QUAD relies on the
hardness of solving systems of multivariate quadratic
equations. Bardet et al. [11] presented a cryptanalysis al-
gorithm with a complexity bounded by O(2134.56), which
means this cryptanalysis method cannot put into practice.
In recent years, GPUs are widely used in cloud com-
puting and blockchain, which faces huge security challenges
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to guarantee data security and user privacy [12–14]. Several
GPU acceleration schemes for multivariate systems are
proposed to make it suitable for security of cloud computing
and blockchain in the quantum world [15, 16]. In 2014,
Tanaka et al. [15] proposed two efficient parallelization al-
gorithms and a GPU-based multivariable quadratic poly-
nomial system. Furthermore, they proposed several effective
parallel implementations of QUAD on GPU to accelerate the
computing of quadratic polynomials. In 2018, Liao et al. [16]
proposed a GPU acceleration framework for high-order
multivariate cryptography systems, where the GPU accel-
eration schemes made multivariate cryptosystems feasible
for cloud computing and blockchain.
Moreover, multivariate cryptosystems are in general
computationally efficient, which supports the use of the
Internet of +ings (IoT) devices. IoT is essentially a network
of pervasive devices such as RFID tags, sensors, ASICs, and
smart cards, which have rigid cost constraints in terms of
area, memory, computing power, and battery supply. Tra-
ditional cryptosystems are not entirely applicable to the IoT
devices since they are too expensive for such pervasive
devices. At fast software encryption (FSE) 2010, Billet et al.
[17] showed that QUAD can be converted to efficiently
construct a privacy-preserving authentication protocol for
RFID with provable security. Arditti et al. [18] presented a
QUAD implementation and regarded it as the smallest
provably secure stream cipher so far. +e smallest QUAD
implementation requires only 2961 GE, which makes it a
competitive candidate for IoT security. Also, Hamlet et al.
[19] proposed a throughput-optimized parallel imple-
mentation of QUAD for more secure application scenarios
in 2015.
+e implementation of cryptography needs to take a
wide range of physical attacks into account, especially side-
channel attacks and fault attacks. Side-channel attacks ex-
ploit the dependency between physical information (e.g.,
power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, and timing in-
formation) and secret key to enable a divide-and-conquer
attack to reveal the key part by part. Typical side-channel
attacks include nonprofiled attacks (e.g., correlation power
analysis (CPA) [20], mutual information analysis (MIA)
[21]) and profiled attacks (e.g., template attacks (TA)
[22–28] and other machine learning-based side-channel
attacks [28–34]). Profiled side-channel attacks are the most
powerful attacks, which received a lot of attention in recent
years. Samples of power traces are regarded as features, and
feature selection methods are needed to reduce the com-
putational complexity and increase the prediction accuracy
[28]. Afterward, machine leaning techniques including
maximum-likelihood strategy [22–28], SVM [28–30], ran-
dom forest (RF) [28, 29], k-nearest neighbors (KNN) [31],
neural networks (NNs) [32], and deep learning (DL) [33, 34]
are widely applied to build the prediction model. Profiled
side-channel attacks include a profiling/training phase and a
matching/predicting phase. In the profiling/training phase,
machine learning algorithms are fed with labelled power
traces captured from a reference device to build the pre-
diction model. In the matching/predicting phase, prediction
models are used to predict the correct labels for those power
traces captured from a target device.
Template attack was first proposed at CHES’02 [22],
which efficiently revealed the key by a maximum-likelihood
strategy, and was rapidly accepted as the strongest form of
side-channel attack. Original template attack matched only
a single power trace, which sometimes failed in the
practical attack. Agrawal et al. [23] proposed template-
based DPA attack to accumulate the matching results of
power traces, which significantly improved the success rate.
O¨zgen et al. [24] combined classification algorithms with
template attacks in the matching phase to improve the
efficiency of attacks. Choudary and Kuhn [25] tackled some
of the practical obstacles of template attacks, such as pooled
covariance matrices, compression methods, and incom-
patibility of templates across different devices. Zhang [27]
theoretically analyzed the exact relationship between the
success rate of template attack and values of different
parameters, including signal-to-noise, number of inter-
esting points, and number of power traces. From the
viewpoint of machine learning, Picek et al. [28] adopted
feature selection techniques to improve the attack effi-
ciency. +ey concluded that L1 regularization wrapper and
linear SVM hybrid methods performed consistently well
for all data sets.
Although side-channel attacks have been developed over
20 years, research about side-channel attacks onmultivariate
cryptosystems is still in the early stages. Several literatures
about side-channel attack on multivariate cryptosystems
were published. In as early as 2005, Okeya et al. [35] analyzed
the power leakage of addition operations modulo 232 of
SHA-1 and successfully recovered the secret information of
SFLASH, which is the first successful power analysis attack
on multivariate cryptography in practice. Later, in 2013,
Hashimoto et al. [36] proposed a theoretical method based
on fault attack to reveal the partial key of MPKC systems. Yi
and Li [37] proposed a fault attack and DPA on ASIC
implementation of enTTS scheme in 2017. In 2018, Park
et al. [38] presented a correlation power analysis attack
against the Rainbow and UOV schemes on an 8-bit AVR
microcontroller that yields full secret key recoveries. In 2019,
based on the work of Hashimoto et al., Kra¨mer and Loiero
[39] complemented the research on fault attacks of multi-
variate signature schemes. However, their attacks do not lead
to complete key recovery on Rainbow and UOV. Recently, Li
et al. [40] proposed a CPA attack against serial imple-
mentation of QUAD on FPGA. +eir work efficiently
revealed the secret key but still requires further work to
improve success rate.
Li et al. proposed the practical CPA cryptanalysis on
serial QUAD (2, 160, 160) with a much lower complexity,
but the success rate is only around 85%. Because of the low
signal-to-noise ratio, classic template attack and template-
attack DPA attack cannot exactly match the templates to
achieve a satisfactory success rate. To tackle this issue, we
have proposed template-based least-square power analysis
on serial QUAD (2, 160, 160).+emain contributions of our
paper can be highlighted as follows:
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(1) By applying the least-square technique to enable
fuzzy matching of the templates, which can find the
best matching via minimizing the squared sum of
errors. As a result, the proposed practical can achieve
a success rate of nearly 100%.
(2) We also extend the template-based least-square
power analysis attack to explore the leakage of
parallel implementation of QUAD (2, 160, 160),
which has successfully and efficiently revealed the
secret key with a success rate also close to 100%.
(3) For multivariate cryptography, all monomials and
polynomials can be computed in an arbitrary order
to break the link between the power consumption
and the secret key. We propose two low-cost hiding
countermeasures for serial and parallel imple-
mentations, respectively, which show great potential
to resist side-channel attacks.
+e remaining paper is organized as follows: in Section 2,
we review the mathematical definition, serial and parallel
FPGA implementations of the QUAD stream cipher; in
Section 3, the template-based least-square power analysis
attacks on the serial and parallel FPGA implementation of
the QUAD are presented; experimental results of our attacks
are given in Section 4; efficient and low-cost countermea-
sures to resist side-channel attacks are discussed in Section 5;
and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminaries
2.1.MultivariateCryptography. Generally, the mathematical
definition of a multivariate quadratic equation with n var-
iables over GF (q) can be written as follows:
Q x1, . . . , xn( ) � ∑
1≤i≤j≤n αijxixj + ∑1≤i≤n βixi + c, (1)
where αij, βi, and c are all coefficients over GF (q). Note that
the degree of polynomial is up to 2; otherwise, new variables
will be introduced to keep the polynomial of degree 2. A
multivariate quadratic system Q(X) consisting of m mul-
tivariate quadratic equations in n variables over GF (q) is
defined as
Q(X) � Q1(X), . . . , Qm(X){ }, X � x1, . . . , xn. (2)
Given a multivariate quadratic system Q(X), the MQ
problem is defined as to find a value X � x1, . . . , xn, if any,
such that Qi(X) � 0 for all 1≤ i≤m. +e MQ problem is
proved to be NP hard, even in the smallest finite filed GF (2)
[10].
A particular QUAD stream cipher in n variables over GF
(q) is specified as QUAD (q, n, r), which computes n + r
polynomials per round. As shown in Figure 1, QUAD (q, n,
r) consists of an output function
Sout(X) � (Qn+1(X), . . . , Qn+r(X)) to produce r outputs as
the keystream, and an update function
Sin(X) � (Q(X)1, . . . , Qn(X)) is used to generate n outputs
to update X for the next round. +e parameters q, n, and r
and the coefficients αij, βi, and c for Sin and Sout are public.
+e QUAD cipher expands a secret initial state X0 ∈ GF(q)n
into a sequence of secret states X0, X1, X2, . . . ∈ GF(q)n and
a sequence of output vectors Y0, Y1, Y2, . . . ∈ GF(q)r.
QUAD (2, 160, 160) is a practical version with the se-
curity level of at least 280, which is strongly recommended in
[10]. QUAD (2, 160, 160) has 160 variables over GF (2),
which outputs 160 bits per round, resulting in a set of 320
multivariate quadratic equations.
From a perspective of implementation, operations over
GF (2) are more efficient than those over larger fields.
Moreover, the monomial forms xi · xi and xi are equal over
GF (2); therefore, αijxixj and βixi can be computed together.
In the case of randomly generated αij and c, equations of
QUAD over GF (2) can be simplified as
Q(X) � ∑
1≤i≤j≤n αijxixj + c, (3)
which brings great benefits in terms of efficiency and
security.
2.2. FPGASerial Implementation ofQUAD. Arditti et al. [18]
proposed a compact serial implementation of QUAD, which
is believed to be the smallest provably secure stream cipher.
As shown in Figure 2, the implementation consists of two
main components. +e first one is a nonlinear feedback shift
register (NFSR), in which the coefficients of α and c are
randomly generated. Each monomial of the equation is
computed by the second component at every clock tick and
accumulated to a result register. Multivariate quadratic
equations Q1(X), Q2(X), . . ., Qn+r(X) are computed se-
quentially. At every clock tick, the NFSR generates the
coefficient. Once a new monomial αijxixj of polynomial
Qk(X) is computed, its contribution will be accumulated to
the temporary register Qk. After n(n + 1)/2 + 1 clock cycles,
the polynomial Qk(X) is computed, and the above process is
repeated for Qk+1(X).
2.3. FPGA Parallel Implementation of QUAD. Hamlet and
Brocato [19] presented two throughput-optimized parallel
implementations of QUAD for amuch higher throughput. A
QUAD (2, 128, 128) version with the security level of ap-
proximately 264 is considered, which can be easily extended
to another version in GF (2) such as QUAD (2, 160, 160).
+e coefficients α and c are randomly generated and stored
in ROM. Multivariate quadratic equations
Yi
Sout (X)Sin (X)
Xi+1
Xi (initial X0)
Figure 1: Stream cipher generation in QUAD [9].
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Q1(X), Q2(X), . . . , Qn+r(X) are still computed sequentially,
while n monomials of polynomial Qk(X) are computed in
parallel at a time to achieve a higher throughput.
As shown in Figure 3, the FPGA parallel implementation
of QUAD (2, 160, 160) is summarized as follows:
(1) Sequentially compute the equations Q1(X), Q2(X),
. . ., Q320(X) by step (2) to step (6).
(2) Initialize the internal state X and rotated X with the
secret key and the initialization vector.
(3) Calculate ηi � xi AND rotatedxi, 1≤ i≤ 160
simultaneously.
(4) Load 160-bit coefficients α from ROM, feed η and α
into 8-input AND-XOR modules to compute
Mc � ∑3≥i≥0α4c− iη4c− i, 1≤ c≤ 40, and store Mc in
temporary register Pc.
(5) Calculate Vc1 � ∑3≥i≥0M4c1− i, 1≤ c1 ≤ 10, by XOR
modules. Compute Qk(X) � Qk(X)⊕∑1≤i≤10Vi and
store the value in result register Q.
(6) Rotate the internal state rotated X by one bit, and go
to step 3 to compute next 160 monomials until all
monomials of polynomial Qk(X) are completed,
which requires ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ � 81 loops. Note that, in
the last loop, only half of the above modules are
enabled to compute the last 80 monomials.
(7) Repeat the above steps until all quadratic equations
are computed.
3. Proposed Attack on
Implementation of QUAD
3.1. Power Leakage Model. A typical CMOS transistor
consumes dynamic power when its output signal is
converted. Figure 4(a) shows the changing process of a
register when the output signal is converted from 0 to 1. A
charging current from the power supply to the output ca-
pacitance CL and a transient short-circuit current from
CMOS transistor are generated. On the contrary, Figure 4(b)
shows the discharging process when the output signal is
converted from 1 to 0. Only the instantaneous short-circuit
current is generated through CMOS transistor.
As a result, conversions of the output signal are focused
since dynamic power is the major power consumption of the
digital logical circuits of ASIC and FPGA. Denote the power
consumption of CMOS transistor by Pij when its signal
converts from i to j, where i and j equal to 0 or 1. P01 and P10
consume dynamic power, while P00 and P11 consume only
static power. As a result, it generally holds that
P00 ≈ P11≪P01, P10.
+erefore, the power consumption when writing data to
a register depends on the number of bit-flips. A hamming
distance (HD) model well summarizes the power con-
sumption of a register transition from a previous state to a
new state.
Regarding multivariate cryptosystems, which consist of a
large number of monomials and polynomials, registers are
indeed required to store monomial and polynomial values
during the encryption. Serial implementation, for instance,
monomials are computed sequentially and accumulated to
the temporary register Qk, as identified by rectangle in
Figure 2.
+e value of register Qk changes to Qk ⊕ αijxixj for all
monomials. +e power consumption of register Qk can be
concluded as follows:
L(Q(x)) � HD Qk, Qk ⊕ αijxixj( ) � HW αijxixj( ), 1≤ k≤ 160.
(4)
Consequently, an attacker is possible to predict secret
keys xi and xj by observing the power consumption of
registers Ql.
Other than serial implementations, parallel imple-
mentations compute 160 monomials simultaneously. 4
monomials are accumulated by an AND-XOR module and
stored into temporary register Pc. According to the parallel
implementation described in Section 2.3, when computing
the first 160 monomials, the values Mc, 1≤ c≤ 40, stored into
the temporary register Pc are
Mc � a4c− 3,4c− 3x4c− 3x4c− 3 ⊕ a4c− 2,4c− 2x4c− 2x4c− 2 ⊕ a4c− 1,4c− 1x4c− 1x4c− 1 ⊕ a4c,4cx4cx4c, 1≤ c≤ 40. (5)
Loop n(n+1)/2
...
Done
akij
xi xj
AND
AND XOR
Sin
Sout
Output
Q1
Qk
Qk
Q320
NFSR
0 1
Result (Q1, …, Q320)
X = (x1, …, xn)
Figure 2: Serial implementation of QUAD (2, 160, 160) [18].
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After rotating the internal state rotated x by one bit to
compute the next 160 monomials, the values Mc′, 1≤ c≤ 40,
stored into registers Pc are
Mc′ � a4c− 3,4c− 2x4c− 3x4c− 2 ⊕ a4c− 2,4c− 1x4c− 2x4c− 1 ⊕ a4c− 1,4cx4c− 1x4c ⊕ a4c,4c+1x4cx4c+1, 1≤ c≤ 39,
Mc′ � a157,158x157x158 ⊕ a158,159x158x159 ⊕ a159,160x159x160 ⊕ a1,160x160x1, c � 40. (6)
+erefore, the values of registers Pc, 1≤ c≤ 40, change
from Mc to Mc′, and the power leakage model of parallel
implementations can be defined as
L(Q(x)) � H D Mc, Mc′( ) � HW Mc ⊕Mc′( ), 1≤ c≤ 40.
(7)
3.2. Template-Based Least-Square Power Analysis Attack.
Classic side-channel attacks, such as DPA, CPA, and MIA,
require a large number of power traces to reveal the key,
which means that different plaintexts are needed to be
encrypted with the same key for obtaining as much power
traces as possible. However, multivariate cryptosystems
usually contain limited quadratic equations. Take QUAD as
an example, and the key of QUAD is constantly updated
after each round of encryption, which only generates n + r
power traces with the same key. In this case, machine
learning-based side-channel attacks such as template attack
have inherent advantages, which can extract the key with
much fewer target power traces.
Machine learning-based side-channel attacks are the
most powerful attacks. Based on a maximum-likelihood
strategy, template attacks reveal the secret key efficiently,
which consist of a profiling phase and a matching phase.
Classic template attacks match only a single power trace and
reveal the key by the Bayes theorem in the matching phase.
However, there is not enough valuable information in a
CL
Rmeas
Rmeas
VDD
(a)
CL
Rmeas
Rmeas
VDD
(b)
Figure 4: Charging and discharging process of register.
M V
Rotated X X
Sin
AND
AND−XOR_40 XOR_10
XOR_2
XOR_1AND−XOR_1
AND−XOR_2R
O
M
4
4
4
4
4
4
40 Tmp (P1, …, P40)
10 XOR
4
4
4
……
0
1
160 160
1
1
akij
Loop ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉
Tmp (R1, …, R10)
Result (Q1, …, Q320)
Done
Q1
Qk
Qk
Q320
Sout
Output
η
Figure 3: Parallel implementation of QUAD (2, 160, 160) [19].
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single power trace to reveal the correct key in practical
situation; hence, the classic template attack has little pros-
pect of success rate.
To solve this problem, template-based DPA attack was
proposed as follows [23]:
p kj
∣∣∣∣∣ T( ) �
∏1≤i≤Dp ti ∣∣∣∣ kj( )( ) · p kj( )
∑1≤l≤K ∏1≤i≤Dp ti ∣∣∣∣ kl( )( ) · p kl( )( ), (8)
which accumulates the matching degree of each power trace
during template matching to improve the success rate.
Unfortunately, due to the low signal-to-noise ratio, the
accurate matching method of template-based DPA attack is
not applicable. For this reason, we proposed a template-
based least-square (LSQ) power analysis attack, which re-
veals the key by fuzzy matching. As described in Figure 5, the
main idea of template-based LSQ is as follows:
(1) Choose a strategy to build templates: according to
the power leakage models in equations (4) and (7),
two templates need to be built, corresponding to
leakage values 0 and 1.
(2) Collect power traces to build templates: two groups
of power traces are collected according to different
leakage values.
(3) Select interesting points (features): samples of power
traces are regarded as features, which include rele-
vant, irrelevant, and redundant features. Feature
selection methods are needed to select the most
relevant features to improve the attack efficiency.
Feature selection methods [28] such as squared
pairwise T-differences (SOST), Pearson correlation,
principal component analysis (PCA), linear SVM
wrapper, and L1 regularization are investigated. In
our experiments, the Pearson correlation method is
chosen to search interesting points, which can lead to
excellent classification performance. 25 interesting
points for serial implementation and 35 interesting
points for parallel implementation with the highest
ρt,hw are selected, where ρt,hw is defined as
ρt,hw �
cov(t, hw)
σtσhw
. (9)
(4) Build templates with interesting points: two tem-
plates hi � (mi, Ci) corresponding to leakage values 0
and 1 are built, respectively, by covariance matrix Ci
and mean vector mi, where mi and Ci are defined as
mi �
1
d
∑
1≤j≤d tij,
Ci(u, v) �
1
d − 1
∑
1≤l≤d Nul − Nu( ) · Nvl − Nv( ),
(10)
(5) Match templates: power traces T � t1, t2, . . . , tD{ }
with the same key are captured from the device
under attack to match the templates, respectively.
Template that leads to the highest probability
p(tj; (mi, Ci)) indicates the correct leakage value,
where p(tj; (mi, Ci)) is defined as
p tj; mi, Ci( )( ) �
exp − (1/2) · tj − mi( )′ · C− 1i · tj − mi( )( )
��������������
(2 · π)T · det Ci( )
√ .
(11)
Denote such leakage values corresponding to T �
t1, t2, . . . , tD{ } as H � [h1, h2, . . . , hD].
(6) Reveal the correct key. We map the hypothetical
intermediate values into leakage values by equation
(7) and compare with H � [h1, h2, . . . , hD] to reveal
the correct key. Taking attack on parallel imple-
mentations, for instance, denote the hypothetical
leakage values by S � s1, s2, . . . , s32{ }, where
si � si1, si2, . . . , si D{ }. +e least-square method de-
fined as
F(i) � ∑
1≤ j≤D sij − hj( )2, 1≤ i≤ 32, 1≤ j≤D, (12)
is applied to compare the hypothetical leakage values with the
leakage values revealed by the template attack, where i is the key
hypothesis. Finally, the correct key is revealed by
key � argminF(i). (13)
4. Experimental Results and Discussion
As shown in Figure 6, our experimental setup includes a
standard evaluation board SAKURA-G, an oscilloscope, and
a computer. SAKURA-G is designed for hardware security,
which equips with two separate Spartan-6 FPGA chips. One
chip serves as the control chip, while another serves as the
cryptographic chip. Cryptographic chip performs encryp-
tion operations, while the control chip controls the data flow
and communicates with the oscilloscope and computer.
During encryption, power consumptions of the crypto-
graphic chip are measured by the oscilloscope which is
triggered by the control chip. Finally, power analysis attacks
are performed on the computer.
We first perform a side-channel attack on serial
implementation of QUAD (2, 160, 160). In the template
building phase, 3000 power traces with different keys and
coefficients are captured from a reference device, based on
which 25 interesting points are selected by the CPA peak
method. Next, we collect two groups of power traces cor-
responding to leakage values 0 and 1 in equation (4), and
each group consists of 25 power traces. Finally, we build two
templates, and the result is shown in Figure 7.
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In the template matching phase, 320 power traces with
the same key are captured from the target device. Template
that leads to the highest probability indicates the correct key.
+e success rate of template-based LSQ attack on serial
implementation is shown in Figure 8. When the number of
power traces approach 30, the success rate tends to 100%.
+erefore, a successful attack only requires 30 power traces
in serial implementation.
To further illustrate the effectiveness of our attack, the
time required for our practical attack on serial QUAD is
discussed here. Our attack is performed on a personal
computer, which integrates an Intel i5-7500 CPU and 12GB
of RAM. +e time for templates building and templates
matching depends on the number of power traces for building
and matching, respectively. Figure 9 shows the time required
for the template building with the number of power traces
ranging from 1 to 3000. Figure 10 shows the time required for
template matching with the number of power traces ranging
from 1 to 30. As our successful attack on the serial imple-
mentation of QUAD (2, 160, 160) requires less than 3000
power traces for templates building and 30 power traces for
templates matching, the total time required for our successful
attack is less than 1010 seconds, according to Figures 9 and 10.
According to the leakage model of parallel imple-
mentation in equation (7), 4 bits of the key are simulta-
neously accumulated into temporary register. Consequently,
we need to guess 4 bits at a time. In the template building
phase, 10000 power traces with different keys and coeffi-
cients are captured from a reference device, based on which
35 interesting points are selected by the CPA peak method.
Next, we collect two groups of power traces corresponding
0
1
Choosing strategy
Collecting power traces
Selecting
interesting points (features)
Building templates
Matching templates
Comparing based on LSQ
Revealing the key
S
32×D
=
D
H
1
1
1
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…
…
…
… … … ……
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1
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0
0
0 0
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Figure 5: +e flow of template-based LSQ attack.
Figure 6: Experimental setup.
5 10 15 20 25
Interesting points
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
Po
w
er
 co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
va
lu
e
HW0
HW1
×10–3
Figure 7: Templates built for serial QUAD.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Number of power traces
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Su
cc
es
s r
at
e (
%
)
Figure 8: Success rates of our attack on serial implementation.
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to leakage values 0 and 1 in equation (7), and each group
consists of 35 power traces. Finally, we build two templates,
and the result is shown in Figure 11.
In the template matching phase, 320 power traces with
the same key are captured from the target device. Template
that leads to the highest probability indicates the correct key.
+e success rate of template-based LSQ attack on parallel
implementation is shown in Figure 12. When the number of
power traces approach 150, the success rate tends to 100%.
+erefore, 150 power traces are sufficient for a successful
attack in parallel implementation.
Figure 13 shows the time required for the template
building with the number of power traces ranging from 1 to
10000. Figure 14 shows the time required for template
matching with the number of power traces ranging from 1 to
180. As our successful attack on the parallel implementation
of QUAD (2, 160, 160) requires less than 10000 power traces
for templates building and 150 power traces for templates
matching, the total time required for our successful attack is
less than 1977 seconds, according to Figures 13 and 14.
In order to compare the success probability of the at-
tacks, we performed our attack, template attack, and tem-
plate-based DPA attacks dozens of times, respectively. We
compare the typical results in Table 1, which shows that our
proposed attack has the highest accuracy, greatly out-
performing template attack, and template-based DPA attack.
5. Suggested Countermeasures
Side-channel countermeasures aim at reducing the data
dependency between physical information and secret key.
Usually, masking and hiding technologies are adopted. For
multivariate cryptography, all monomials and polynomials
can be computed in an arbitrary order. +erefore, the basic
idea of countermeasures for multivariate cryptography is to
randomly change the sequence of these operations.
A QUAD (q, n, r) has (n + r) × n(n + 1)/2 monomials,
which can be randomly computed in ((n + r) × n(n + 1)/2)!
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orders. However, it is too expensive to implement such
algorithm. We propose a low-cost shuffling countermeasure
by partially changing the orders of monomials for each
polynomial equation Qk(X). Starting with two randomly
generated index is and js, 1< is ≤ js ≤ n, each polynomial is
computed in the order as follows:
Q(x) � ∑
js ≤ j≤ n αisjxisxj + ∑is+1( )≤ i≤ j≤ n αijxixj + ∑1≤ i≤ is− 1( ),i≤ j≤ n αijxixj + ∑is ≤ j≤ js− 1( ) αisjxisxj + c. (14)
A random index generator is required to generate such
an order index, as shown in Figure 15, whose imple-
mentation requires only 556GE.
For the parallel implementations, we proposed a low-
cost hiding countermeasure by partially randomizing the
initial value of rotated x to shuffle the computation orders of
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Table 1: Comparison of the success rates of different template attacks.
No. of experiments/success rate of attack 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Template-based LSQ attack (%) 98.12 97.25 100 97.25 100 100 100 97.25 96.875 100
Template-based DPA attack (%) 71.88 65.63 71.88 68.75 81.25 75 81.25 78.13 68.75 75
Template attack (%) 61.75 71.88 53.125 65.63 75 68.75 61.75 65.63 63.75 59.375
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monomials. Before each calculation of Qk(X), the initial
value of rotated x is partially randomized with the random
starting index is as follows:
rotatedx � xis, xis+1, . . . , xn, x1, . . . xis− 1( ). (15)
6. Conclusions
Multivariate cryptosystems consist of a large number of
monomials and polynomials, where registers are required to
store monomial and polynomial values during the en-
cryption. +erefore, a hamming distance (HD) model of the
register will leak the secret of the implementation.
By applying the least-square technique to enable fuzzy
matching of the templates, we propose a practical template-
based least-square power analysis, where both the serial and
parallel implementations of QUAD (2, 160, 160) can achieve
a success rate close to 100%. +e proposed two low-cost
hiding countermeasures for serial and parallel imple-
mentations are also validated to be effective, where all
monomials and polynomials can be computed in an arbi-
trary order to break the link between the power con-
sumption and the secret key in multivariate cryptography.
Our proposed attacks require only 30 and 150 power traces,
respectively, to successfully reveal the secret key. Future
work will focus on low-cost countermeasures of multivariate
cryptography for IoT devices to resist side-channel attacks.
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